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Consciousness: The rules of engagement
Richard Mould
∗
Abstract
We examine the role of a conscious observer in a typical quantum
mechanical measurement. Four rules are given that govern stochastic
choice and state reduction in several cases of continuous and intermittent
observation. It is found that consciousness always accompanies a state
reduction leading to observation, but its presence is not sufficient to ‘cause’
a reduction. The distinction is clarified and codified by the rules that are
given below. This is the first of several papers that lead to an experimental
test of the rules, and of the “parallel principle” that is described elsewhere.
Introduction
A free particle interacts with a detector in such a way that it might be cap-
tured, or it might pass over the detector without being captured. During the
interaction the quantum mechanical state of the system is given by
Φ(t) = ψ(t)D0 +D1(t) (1)
where ψ(t) is the incoming/scattered particle wave as a function of time. This
function is correlated with a detector stateD0 that has not captured the particle.
The second component D1(t) is the detector state that includes the captured
particle. D1(t) is initially equal to zero and increases in time, whereas ψ(t)D0
is initially normalized and decreases in time.
The first component in eq. 1 is really a time dependent expansion that de-
scribes a gradual transfer of momentum from the scattered part of the wave to
the detector, including y-components. But because of the macroscopic nature
of the detector, these details can be ignored; so the detector state D0 is approx-
imated by a single constant term that is factored out of its entanglement with
the scattered wave. With D0 normalized, we have
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∫
{ψ(t)∗ψ(t) +D1(t)
∗D1(t)} = 1
It may be objected that eq. 1 cannot be a superposition of quantum me-
chanical states because the detector states are macroscopic. Strictly speaking,
each component in eq. 1 should have an environmental term attached, because
the two detector states affect the radiation or sonic field differently. So the first
component should read D0E0, and the second component should read D1E1,
where E0 and E1 are orthonormal environmental states.
Φ(t) = ψ(t)D0E0 +D1(t)E1
The cross terms are therefore zero when the environment is integrated out, re-
flecting environmental decoherence. This means that the detector states cannot
locally interfere with one another, and this is often considered to be the defining
property of a macroscopic system. It is what generally justifies calling a macro-
scopic object “classical” [1, 2]. But non-interference is not really a universal
property of macroscopic things, for certain macroscopic systems at low temper-
atures have been shown to display interference effects as a result of cryostatic
isolation from the environment [3, 4, 5, 6].
The defining property of a macroscopic system is only that it is ‘big’. It
is no less quantum mechanical if it lacks interference terms. Since a possible
phase relationship between the two components in eq. 1 is of no importance
to the problem being considered, that possibility is hereafter ignored together
with the above environmental terms. In every other respect the detector is a
quantum mechanical object that responds to a quantum mechanical interaction
with the particle. I therefore continue to call the sum of components in eq. 1 a
quantum mechanical superposition1.
The Conscious Observer
My primary assumption is that conscious brains are legitimate components of
a quantum mechanical system, and that it is proper to ask how consciousness
interacts with the system if it is present during an ongoing interaction. Brains,
conscious or not, are subject to the same principles of environmental decoher-
ence as any other macroscopic object, so they are similarly responsive to the
1Joss and Zeh call the local system an “improper mixture”(ref. 1). I refer to the total
superposition because it is the system’s quantum mechanical properties that I want to explore.
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methodology of quantum mechanics. They just don’t display interference ef-
fects. This treatment shares Everett’s many-world assumption that conscious
brains are ordinary quantum mechanical objects [7], but it differs in that the
rules adopted below allow only one of the many-world branches to be conscious
at a time.
Figure 1
We begin by examining the above interaction when viewed by an observer
as shown in fig. 1. The first stage of the figure shows the particle approaching
the detector, where the particle is represented by the shaded area moving to the
right, and the detector is represented by the stationary white rectangle. The
observer is represented in the figure by an eye that is viewing that surface.
The observer is engaged by radiation coming from the detector. Equation 1
is therefore amended to include normalized brain states of the observer B0 and
B1 that are correlated with the detector states D0 and D1.
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Φ(t) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1
Since the time of Schro¨dinger’s cat it has been considered unphysical to imag-
ine a ‘conscious’ brain state in superposition with something else. But if the
observer is consciously looking at the detector from the beginning, and if the
interaction proceeds for a finite time before the detector (possibly) captures the
particle, then during that time B0 will be conscious and will be continuously
interacting with the detector. So prior to the particle being captured, B0 will be
conscious and B1 will not be conscious. I denote this difference by underlining
B0 but not B1, thereby amending the above equations to read
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B0 is entangled with D0 and B1 is entangled with D1; so strictly speaking, they cannot
be represented as the simple products D0B0 and D1B1. As before, this is an approximation
that is justified by the macroscopic nature of these states.
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Φ(t) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (2)
I call B1 a ready brain state, which means that it is physiologically capable
of becoming a conscious state if and when the detector is stochastically chosen
(i.e., if and when there is a capture). There are therefore three categories of
brain states (i) conscious, (ii) unconscious, and (iii) ready. The latter does not
have a classical meaning, for it occurs only in a quantum mechanical superposi-
tion. The distinction between a conscious brain state and a ready brain state is
unavoidable if one accepts the possibility that brain states can exist in quantum
mechanical superposition, and that only one component can be conscious at a
time. The other components would then be ‘ready’.
A ready state is not unconscious. An unconscious state is physiologically
incapable of consciousness as when the observer is asleep or dead; whereas,
a ready brain state is fully capable of consciousness when it is stochastically
“realized”. Measuring any quantum mechanical variable produces an eigenvalue
that is consciously realized, as opposed to others that are not. In this case, B1
will not become “real” unless and until it is stochastically chosen to succeed B0.
That happens when the detector captures the particle.
A brain state B or B will be understood to be limited to the part of the
cortex that can be set into direct correspondence with conscious experience.
This excludes all those parts of the brain that are involved in image processing.
These “lower” parts will now be included in the detector, so the detector in
eq. 2 is different than the one in eq. 1.
According to the von Neumann theory of state reduction, it is consciousness
that initiates the reduction of a quantum mechanical state [8]. We see that
that is not true, for the superposition in eq. 2 is not reduced by the presence
of a conscious brain state in one of its components. However, consciousness
is associated with the state reduction that occurs when the detector records a
particle capture.
Possible Outcomes
Suppose the particle is detected and observed before the end of the interaction.
This will require a stochastic choice based on quantum mechanical probabilities,
and we will say that that happens at a time tsc. The state in eq. 2 will then be
reduced, giving
Φ(t ≥ tsc) = D1B1 (3)
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In this case, the superposition in eq. 2 is reduced so that only its second com-
ponent survives, consciousness is transferred to the brain state B1, and the
interaction is terminated.
The other possible outcome is that there is no particle capture during the
time of the interaction. In that case eq. 2 will remain undisturbed, even after
the interaction is complete at time tf . The system will therefore remain in a
residual superposition given by
Φ(t > tf ) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(tf )B1 (4)
Since the observer is only conscious of the first component in this equation, the
existence of the second (not conscious) component is of no empirical concern,
even when there is no longer any possibility of a capture. Of course, the form
of eq. 4 is potentially important to another observer who, after tf , observes the
system over the shoulder of the primary observer. We will see in another section
that the second component in eq. 4 will be eliminated by the mere ‘interactive’
presence of a second observer. In addition, we will see it eliminated by the
primary observer himself when his conscious attention drifts in any way from
the state B
0
. However, for the moment we will leave eq. 4 as it stands. It is not
empirically wrong.
The Rules
I accept that brain states can exist in superposition with themselves, but I
do not accept an Everett-like plurality of simultaneous conscious components.
It is therefore necessary to find the general rules that govern the relationship
between conscious and ready brain states, consistent with the requirement that
only one conscious state of an observer can be realized at a time. In particular,
the rules must tell us how and when a reduction occurs so as to bring about the
outcomes in the previous section. I propose four rules that I believe are sufficient
to describe all the interactions that are considered in this and in subsequent
papers. These rules are ad hoc in that they are made to fit the cases studied. It
is my belief that if and when we find a proper theory of the relationship between
consciousness and matter, these rules, or rules like them, will naturally emerge.
The first three rules are adequate to deal with the outcomes in eqs. 3 and 4,
as well as several other situations that are described in the following sections. I
therefore begin by introducing just these three. The fourth rule will be offered
when it becomes clear that the first three by themselves are unable to resolve a
particular difficulty that arises.
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A central concept in rule (1) is probability current J , which is defined to
be the time rate of change of square modulus. Probability in this treatment is
introduced only through the current J .
Rule(1): For any subsystem of n components in an isolated system with a
square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of
one of those components at time t is given by (ΣnJn)/s, where the net probability
current Jn going into the n
th component at that time is positive.
Rule (1) puts no limit on the kind of state that is chosen, so long as J > 0.
It will apply to any interaction in any representation. There is no need to say
that it applies only to irreversible interactions, or to components representing
macroscopic objects, or to objects that lack the possibility of interference.
I cannot say why Nature should harbor such a triggering device any more
than I can say why Nature should make use of intrinsic probability. But if
probability is natural to a physical system, then so is stochastic choice. With
this understanding, I would say that rule (1) adds nothing that is not already
implicit in standard quantum mechanics; except that the underlying notion of
probability is shifted from the square modulus to the probability current. In
rule (2), an active brain state is one that is either conscious or ready. It is
actively engaged with the apparatus.
Rule(2): If the Hamiltonian gives rise to new components that are not clas-
sically continuous with the old components or with each other, then all active
brain states that are included in the new components will be ready brain states.
This rule provides for the introduction of ready brain states. For example,
if a conscious brain state B interacts with an apparatus state Ak, then the
product of independent states AkB will lose amplitude to an entangled state
AkBk. That is,
AkB becomes AkB +AkBk
As before, I write the result AkBk as a simple product for ease of recognition.
It is a good approximation for these macroscopic states. The emerging state Bk
must be a ready brain state according to rule (2).
In another example, an unknown brain state X interacting with a superpo-
sition of apparatus states Ar +As, will give rise to another superposition
(Ar +As)X becomes (Ar +As)X +ArBr +AsBs
where the emerging states Br and Bs must be ready brain states. In the present
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paper, all different brain states will be discrete. In a future paper we will
consider brain states to be a continuum in which close neighborhood states are
not discrete.
The third rule describes the collapse of the wave function associated with
measurement. This wave collapse, or state reduction, does not interrupt the
Schro¨dinger process, and it does not modify the Hamiltonian or withhold its
continuous application. I regard the collapse as an abrupt change in the bound-
ary conditions on the solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation, and that is all.
This is what an observation does. It adds new information. That informa-
tion abruptly changes the physical context, and hence, it abruptly changes the
Schro¨dinger solution. It does not change the evolutionary process itself.
Rule(3): If a component AB is stochastically chosen, where A is the total
amplitude of a total ready brain state B that emerges from an interaction, then
B will become conscious and all the other components will be immediately reduced
to zero.
This rule does not provide for renormalization after a stochastic choice. One
might include that requirement for convenience, but it is not necessary. We
will continue to normalize B0, B1, and D0, but not Φ(t) following a stochastic
collapse. If rule (1) is followed as stated, the probabilities will work out correctly
without a normalization requirement.
Rule (3) does not say that a ready brain state must be present for there to
be a state reduction. One might suppose that a state reduction can occur in
eq. (1) without the presence of a conscious observation of any kind, but I do
not believe that will ever happen. I believe that a stochastic trigger will have
no consequence unless, through rule (3), a ready brain state is both available
and stochastically chosen, followed by a reduction that favors the chosen state.
My view is similar to one expressed by von Neumann and Wigner that attaches
fundamental importance to conscious observation.
All of the examples that I present in these papers reflect this understanding
because they all deal with reduction in the presence of an observer. If the
reader believes that this thinking is to narrow, he is welcome to generalize
rule (3) to describe a reduction in the absence of an observer. There are many
problems associated with a generality of this kind, principally the question of
representation and basic eigenstates. I dispose of these questions by specializing
the rule as I do. In any case, there can be nothing wrong with my limiting this
study to cases in which an observer is present. We know what the conscious
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experience is in these cases, so we are in possession of the experiential ‘facts’. A
broader interpretation of rule (3) should not invalidate these facts or contradict
the way I put them into a formal framework.
The ‘possible outcomes’ of the previous section follow from these rules.
Rule (1) explains why the first (conscious) component in eq. 2 is not selected
for a reduction that eliminates the second (non-conscious) component. It is be-
cause current flows out of the first component making J < 0. Rule (2) insures
that eq. 2 is not a superposition of two conscious states. Rule (3) tells us why
the conscious state B
1
survives the collapse resulting in eq. 3. It is because the
positive flow of current into the ready state B1 permits a stochastic hit, and that
causes the state to become conscious and to be the sole survivor of the reduc-
tion. These rules therefore describe the expected outcomes of the interaction.
They explain much more as will be shown.
I make no attempt to physiologically define a conscious brain state or a ready
brain state; but however that is done, their role as basis states is a matter of
importance to quantum “epistemology”, even in the Copenhagen interpretation.
Stapp makes the point that according to Copenhagen, the observer “who stands
outside of the Hilbert space structure decides how he will set up the experiments,
and this decision fixes the ‘basis’ (states)”[9]. Something beyond the Schro¨dinger
process is surely necessary to fix the basis, and that is taken by Copenhagen
to be the observer’s experience of the apparatus. In the present treatment the
basis is fixed in the same way, and is made explicit in rule (3). Only through
rule (3) does the trigger have subjective reality implications, and that happens
only when the trigger hits a ready brain state that is created by rule (2). When a
choice like that is made, the chosen state becomes a conscious state, establishing
a new boundary condition on Schro¨dinger’s equation.
It is apparent that consciousness is an important player in the above inter-
action. However, the rules do not represent it as having a ‘causal’ influence of
any kind. The stochastic choice of a ready brain state is said to do two things.
It makes that state conscious and reduces all others to zero. Consciousness is
said to appear in these circumstances, but it will have no effect of its own on
the physical system. The rules therefore preserve the traditional epiphenomenal
nature of consciousness. Of course, a rule (3) reduction depends on the exis-
tence of a ready brain state. To that extent, the observer is an essential part of
the methodology; and that is a departure from standard interpretations in the
direction suggested by von Neumann and Wigner.
Future papers will add two more rules to the four given in this paper. The
additional rules are specific to a model of the brain that takes account of the
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continuous nature of brain states. The first of these addditional rules merely
expands rule (3) to accommodate the continuum case. The final rule that we add
will give consciousness a causal influence that should be measurable in principle.
Therefore, the structure that is developed here has eventual consequences that
are experimentally testable in principle. See the final section of this paper.
A Terminal Observer
Going back to the bare interaction in eq. 1, the question is: do the above
rules adequately describe the expected results of a terminal observation in this
case? Are they adequate to the usual findings in a physics laboratory where an
observer only comes into the picture when the interaction is complete? After
the final pass-over time tf , the system in eq. 1 stabilizes at
Φ(t > tf ) = ψ(t)D0 +D1(tf )
This superposition will be reduced when it interacts with the observer after time
tf . As before, a ready state B0 will become correlated with the ‘no capture’
detector state D0, and B1 will become correlated with the ‘capture’ detector
state D1. The state X given below in eq. 5 is an unknown brain state of the
observer prior to his turning his attention to the detector. State X will not be a
ready brain state3. According to rule (2), the system after the initial interaction
at time tob > tf is
Φ(t ≥ tob > tf ) = ψ(t)D0X +D1(tf )X (5)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0 +D
′
1(tf )B1
where conscious states do not yet appeared, and the primed states in the second
row are equal to zero at the moment of observation. Immediately after that,
the probability currents of the unprimed components will be negative, and the
probability currents of the primed components will be positive
J0 < 0 and J1 < 0 J
′
0 > 0 and J
′
1 > 0
Inasmuch as the initial state is normalized, rule (1) with n = 1 tells us that
the probability of a stochastic hit in time dt is equal to J ′
0
dt for the first primed
3If the terminal observer’s initial X state is either conscious or unconscious, it is that
state that will be “converted” to the new experience when the interaction begins, and not an
associated ready brain state. Rule (4) will provide a reason why X cannot be a ready brain
state.
9
component in eq. 5, and J ′
1
dt for the second. According to rule (3), the first
hit that occurs will cause the affected brain state to become conscious, yielding
either B
0
or B
1
, and will reduce the other states to zero.
We also know that there will be at least one stochastic hit on the system.
Rule (1) with n = 2 gives
∫
[J ′0 + J
′
1]dt = 1
where currents J ′0 and J
′
1 are assumed to flow until the observers physiological
interaction is complete.
The integrated probability of 1.0 insures at least one stochastic hit. Fur-
thermore, there will be no more than one hit because the reduction resulting
from the first hit will reduce all other components to zero. A second hit on the
component that is already conscious is meaningless. Therefore, dropping the
prime and the time dependence, the final state of the system after reduction at
tsc will be either
D1B1 (6)
or ψ(t ≥ tsc > tob > tf )D0B0
depending on the stochastic choice. Both reductions occur with a total proba-
bility given by their square moduli at time tf .
The terminal result in eq. 6 is the one that is most familiar in a physics
laboratory. The first row is identical with eq. 3, and the second is identical
with eq. 4 so far as the observer is concerned, inasmuch as he is unaware in
eq. 4 that he is part of a residual superposition. These results are therefore
in (empirical) agreement with the possible outcomes described above for an
observer who watches the interaction from the beginning.
An Intermediate Observer
Suppose the observer first looks at the detector after the interaction has begun,
but before the particle has stopped interacting with the detector. The observa-
tion will then occur sometime after D1(t) in eq. 1 has acquired a finite value,
and while current into that component is still positive. The equation is then
Φ(tf > t ≥ tob) = ψ(t)D0X +D1(t)X (7)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0 +D
′
1
(t)B1
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where B0 and B1 are the ready brain states of the observer, and where ψ
′(t) and
D′1(t) are zero at tob. State X is again the unknown brain state of the observer
prior to turning attention to the detector; where again, it cannot be a ready
state (footnote 4).
Current flowing vertically from the first row to the corresponding component
in the second row is the result of the physiological interaction. It might very
well give rise to a stochastic choice of D′
1
B1 at some time tsc1, in which case
the entire process will be brought quickly to an end. Dropping the prime and
the time dependence, only the component D1B1 would then survive.
Φ(t ≥ tsc1 > tob) = D1B1 (8)
This reflects the possibility that the particle has already been captured when
the observer makes his appearance.
The other primed component might be stochastically chosen, and that would
select ψ(t)D0B0 (dropping the prime) at a time tsc0 in the middle of the primary
interaction. A mid-stream collapse of this kind is not unphysical. It amounts
to starting again at a time when the function ψ(t) has passed over the detector
to some extent without a particle capture. A physicist might very well look at
the detector in the middle of an interaction, note that the particle has not yet
been detected, and determine the initial conditions to be given by the solitary
component ψ(t)D0B0 starting at the new time tsc0. The interaction would
proceed from there to give
Φ(tf > t ≥ tsc0 > tob) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D
′′
1
(t)B1
where D′′
1
(t)B1 is equal to zero at tsc0. If there is another stochastic hit at a
time tsc1′ , the system will become
Φ(t ≥ tsc1′ > tsc0 > tob) = D1B1 (9)
Equations 8 and 9 are two separate routes to a particle capture. The total
probability of their occurrence is equal to the probability that there was a cap-
ture prior to the intermediate observation, plus the probability of a subsequent
capture.
The remaining possibility is that the interaction terminates without a second
stochastic hit at tsc1′ . Dropping the double prime, the residual superposition
Φ(t > tf > tob) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(tf )B1 (10)
will then persist beyond tf , and will last indefinitely as it did in eq. 4.
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There are therefore two consequences of an intermediate observation. The
observer will either experience a capture (eqs. 8 and 9), or he will experience no
capture and will continue until the end of the interaction as part of the residual
superposition in eq. 10. The observer’s experience after tob is therefore identical
with that of an observer who was on board from the beginning. As in that
case, we claim and will show below that the second component in eq. 10 will
be eliminated by a second observer, or by drift consciousness of the primary
observer.
An Outside Terminal Observer - Rule (4)
If another observer looks at the apparatus at some time tob after the interaction
has terminated in the residual superposition of eq. 4 or eq. 10, we will have
according to rule (2)
Φ(t ≥ tob > tf ) = ψ(t)D0B0X +D1(tf )B1X (11)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0B0 +D
′
1
(tf )B1B1
where the primed components are equal to zero at tob. The brain states of
two observers will appear as a product such as B1X , where the first refers to
the first observer and the second refers to the second observer. In this case,
B1 is the ready brain state of the primary observer, and X is the unknown
brain state of the outside observer prior to his interacting with the detector.
The state X could be either conscious or unconscious, but not ready as per
footnote 4. Equation 11 parallels eq. 5, except that the outside observer is now
in the process of coming on board with the primary observer.
The second component in eq. 11 seems to contribute positive current to the
fourth component, and that could result in a stochastic hit on the capture state
D′
1
(tf )B1B1 after the particle has passed over the detector. This is not possible,
for the primary observer cannot witness a capture after the primary interaction
has been terminated. The rules apparently allow an anomalous capture of this
kind, and we must to do something to insure that that does not happen. Rule (4)
prevents it from happening.
Rule(4)A transition between two components is forbidden if each is an en-
tanglement containing a ready brain state of the same observer.
An interaction between a ready brain state and a conscious or unconscious
state is not affected by this rule. So the primary interaction between the first
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and the second component in eq. 11 is preserved, as is the physiological interac-
tion between the first and the third components. However, rule (4) states that
a primary interaction is not possible between the third and the fourth compo-
nents, and that a physiological interaction is not possible between second and
the fourth components. In addition, there is no term in the Hamiltonian that
directly connects the first and the fourth components. Therefore, the fourth
component D′
1
(tf )B1B1 in eq. 11 does not belong there at all, for it cannot
interact with any of the other components.
The fourth rule does not just say that there is no interaction between ready
brain states. That mild requirement would allow a transition from X to B1 (2
nd
to the 4th component), or from B0 to B1 (3
rd to the 4th component). The rule
is much stronger. It forbids any transition that carries a ready brain state into
itself, or into another ready brain state of the same observer.
Rule (4) solves the anomaly problem. The absent component D′
1
(tf )B1B1
cannot possibly be chosen, so the there will not be an anomalous capture of
the particle after tf . It is also too late (after tf ) for a transition to the second
component. Therefore, the third component is the only candidate for stochastic
choice. Furthermore, rule (1) assures that it will be chosen.
The original state in eq. 11 is Φ(t0) = ψ(t)D0B0X , and current goes from
that state into the second and third components of eq. 11. From rule (1) with
n = 2 we have ∫
[Jx + J0]dt = 1
where currents Jx and J0 flow into D1(t)B1X and ψ
′(t)D0B0B0. The time
integral extends from t0 to the end of the physiological interaction when the
original state is entirely depleted. Since it is stipulated that the second com-
ponent D1(t)B1X in eq. 11 was not chosen during the primary interaction, the
third component ψ′(t)D0B0B0 must be chosen at some time tsc.
From rule (3), the third component will then become ψ(t ≥ tsc > tf )D0B0B0,
and the interaction will be complete with the outside observer on board with
the primary observer. This has the effect of eliminating the superfluous (cap-
ture) component, so the system is no longer a residue superposition. And most
important, there will be no anomalous capture.
In a similar way, any residual superposition can be reduced by the presence
of an outside observer, thereby removing the superfluous component in the
superposition. The rule also explains why the unknown state X appearing in
eqs. 5, 7, and 11 cannot be a ready brain state as claimed in footnote 4. It is
because a ready brain state is forbidden by rule (4) to deliver current to the
primed states appearing in the second row of each of those equations. In the
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second paper in this series, rule (4) forbids other anomalies that are different in
kind from the one described above.
There are now three features of a ready state that distinguish it from a con-
scious state. (i) it is not-conscious, (ii) it can be made conscious by a stochastic
hit, and (iii) it cannot interact with others of its kind. It is not my general
intention to propose physiological mechanisms, but there is one suggestion that
may help understand what might be going on.
Imagine that each ready brain state of an observer includes a physiological
feature that I will call a stop, and require that an interaction is forbidden be-
tween any two states that possess a stop (i.e., between two ready brain states
of an observer). Current can flow into or out of a stopped state, but it cannot
flow between two such states within one observer. Imagine also that this same
physiological difference between a ready state and a conscious state is sufficient
to explain the inability of a ready state to be conscious. And finally, imagine
that when this state is stochastically chosen the stop is disabled, and this allows
the state to become conscious, and to interact more normally with other states.
Although I do not explicitly propose this mechanism, the conjecture illustrates
how a correct understanding of the rules governing psycho-physical interactions
might help to narrow the constraints on the Hamiltonian of a conscious brain.
Reviewing the effect of rule (4) on previous cases, we note that it produces no
change in the terminal observation of eq. 5, or in the intermediate observation
of eq. 7, except to validate the claim that the state X on the first row of these
equations cannot be a ready brain state. We did not previously consider the
possibility of a stochastic choice arising from a current flow from the third to
the fourth component of eq. 7. This possibility is now explicitly forbidden by
rule (4).
An Intermediate Outside Observer
Suppose an outside observer makes an observation during the primary interac-
tion, and before a particle capture, looking over the shoulder of the primary
observer in eq. 2. If tob refers to the time of this observation, then the moment
the outside observer interacts with the detector, the system becomes
Φ(tf > t ≥ tob) = ψ(t)D0B0X +D1(t)B1X (12)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0B0
where there is no possibility of a fourth component because of rule (4). The
primed component is again equal to zero at tob.
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If there is a stochastic hit on the second component in eq. 12 at time tscx,
the result will be
Φ(tf > t = tscx > tob) = D1(t)B1X
This corresponds to a particle capture that occurs before the physiological in-
teraction is complete. Since that interaction is still in engaged, this will lead
directly to
Φ(tf > t ≥ tscx > tob) = D1(t)B1X +D
′
1
(t)B
1
B1
where D′
1
(t)B
1
B1 is equal to zero at tscx.
The only thing that can follow is another stochastic hit at tsc1, giving
Φ(t ≥ tsc1 > tscx) = D1B1B1 (13)
thereby completing the measurement.
If, on the other hand, the third component in eq. 12 is the first to be stochas-
tically chosen at tsc0, the reduction will be
Φ(tf > t = tsc0 > tob) = ψ(t)D0B0B0
where the prime on ψ(t) is dropped. Since the primary interaction is still affec-
tive, this will become
Φ(tf > t ≥ tsc0 > tob) = ψ(t)D0B0B0 +D
′′
1 (t)B1B1 (14)
If there is a second stochastic hit before the particle interaction is complete
at tf , the result will be identical with eq. 13. However, if there is no capture
before tf , the residual superposition
Φ(t > tf ) = ψ(t)D0B0B0 +D
′′
1 (tf )B1B1 (15)
will remain in place as it did in eqs. 4 and 10. As in those cases, the second
component serves no further purpose at this time, and will be removed by the
appearance of a third observer as was previously shown, or by drift consciousness
as will be shown below.
Drift Consciousness
Even though an observer may have a steady eye, his attention is bound to drift
slightly to neighboring brain states that continue to interact with the detector.
Suppose the observer in eq. 2 lets his mind wander to a neighboring brain state
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that still allows him to be aware ofD0, but not in the same way. The neighboring
state may regard the detector from a slightly different angle, or it may include
qualitative differences that have more to do with the observer’s emotional state
than anything else. In any case, a new brain state will become available through
a physiological process that phases out B
0
and gives rise to a new brain state
that also interacts with the detector. The Hamiltonian will direct the drift that
goes from the original brain state to the neighboring states represented as
Φ(t > t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (16)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0a + ψ
′′(t)D0B0b
+ ψ′′′(t)D0B0c + etc.
where Ba, Bb, Bc, etc. are qualitatively different from the given brain state.
Probability current will flow out of the first component in eq. 16 into all
of the other components. Rule (4) forbids current flow to captive states of
the alternative brain states. If one of the primed components is stochastically
chosen at some time tsc, there will be a reduction following rule (3). Assuming
that the double primed component is chosen, we will have
Φ(tsc) = ψ(t)D0B0b (17)
where the primes are now dropped. The drift process will begin again starting
at the new time tsc, giving
Φ(t ≥ tsc) = ψ(t)D0B0b +D
′
1
(t)B1b
+ ψ′′′′(t)D0B0d + etc.
where all but the first component are zero at time tsc. So a system that begins
with the first component of eq. 16, becomes ψ(t)D0B0b in eq. 17 at some later
time. The effect of drifting is therefore to renew the system at a new drift site
at a new time, and to continue the ‘primary’ interaction stating at that time.
If eq. 16 were a residual superposition, the drift result would be eq. 17
without the possibility of a new capture state such asD′
1
(t)B1b. This means that
drifting will eliminate the superfluous component of a residual superposition as
previously claimed. We have seen that a second observer has that effect; and
apparently, the primary observer can do that all by himself.
When I speak of the above physiological drifting I do not mean the eye
motion that produces a jitter of the retina with respect to a visual image. That
motion is part of the image processing that is considered here to be included
in the detector, and is not perceptible in consciousness. A brain state denoted
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by B or B in this paper refers to a higher cortical state in which all image
processing is complete, so the above result can be set into direct correspondence
with conscious awareness. It is the variations in this direct awareness that I say
results in drift consciousness.
On this drift model, the neighborhood states in eq. 16 are finitely separated
from one another. Although the ready brain states in that equation are distinct,
they evolve in an orderly quantum mechanical way that is governed by the
Hamiltonian; whereas, conscious states appear discontinuously when there is
a stochastic switch from one brain state to the next. In a future paper we
will consider the case in which neighboring brain states are differentially close
together.
Phantom Component
It has now been shown that the second component of a residual superposition
can be washed away by the presence of another observer, or by drift conscious-
ness on the part of the primary observer. That component has rule (1) physical
significance as long as current flows into it from the first component; but the
moment that current stops, it is no longer a physically meaningful quantity.
It becomes a phantom component of the superposition. It certainly does have
a non-zero square modulus, but that is not interpreted as ‘probability’ in this
treatment. Of course, a physicist may want to integrate current flow to calculate
total probability, but the validity of that procedure does not mean that Nature
gives intrinsic meaning the absolute value of square modulus. In the case of a
phantom component, square modulus may be said to represent the probability
that the component might have been stochastically chosen, but was not.
Drifting Away
If the observer drifts into unconsciousness by some process such as falling asleep,
then the process will begin in the same way described above. The difference is
that the Hamiltonian will lead the system into a part of the brain that is not
capable of supporting ready brain states, and cannot become conscious. In that
case, the Hamiltonian will drive the “last” conscious component to zero at a
time tu, insuring a decisive exit of consciousness. For instance, suppose that all
of the primed brain states in eq. 16 are unconscious. If the Hamiltonian drives
the first row to zero before the capture state D1(t)B1 can be stochastically
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chosen, then the remaining system will consist of the lingering superposition
Φ(tu) = {ψ
′(t)D0 + ψ
′′(t)D0 + ψ
′′′(t)D0 + etc.}U
where U is the newly acquired unconscious state of the observer4. This leaves
the system in an elaborate superposition of detector states. Since all the times
in this equation are equal, it can be simplified to read
Φ(t ≥ tu) = {ψ(t)D0 +D
′
1(t)}U
where D′
1
(t) is equal to zero at tu. This equation is identical with eq. 1, except
that the unconscious observer is now independent of the interaction.
Fast Interaction
Nothing has been said about the primary interaction time compared to the
physiological interaction time. To take account of a fast primary interaction, a
more complete description of the detector is necessary.
As previously explained, the detector includes the observer, except for the
part of the cortex that can be set into direct correspondence with conscious
experience. It includes all image processing. The detector therefore requires at
least physiological time to do its job. Let it be represented by D(α, β, γ, ..., ω)
where α, β, γ, ..., ω are internal variables. In that case, current flowing into
the detector will first cause α to pulse, then β, and etc. When this input is
‘impulsive’ it will be carried along by the other variables, spreading as it goes,
and arriving at the ready brain site long after the highly localized and fast
moving particle has passed by the detector. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that all of the primary interaction times in the examples in this paper
(governing the horizontal flow) are executed in physiological time, or longer.
A Co-Observer
Finally, consider what would happen if a co-observer participated in the inter-
action with the original observer. Let the scintillation area of the detector be
divided into two parts. We then have two separate brains, where the first brain
in each component of eq. 18 looks at the first detector area, and the second
4Factoring out U is an approximation, inasmuch as the U of each component is entangled
with its own detector/particle state.
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brain looks at the second area. As soon as the detector becomes entangled with
the brain states of each observer, the equivalent to eq. 2 is
Φ(t) = ψ(t)D00B0B0 +D10B1B0 +D01B0B1 (18)
where the detector state D00 displays no captured particle, D10 displays the
captured particle in the first area, and D01 displays the captured particle in the
second area. The dual brain state B0B0 represents the first observer experienc-
ing no scintillations in the first area of the detector, and the second observer
experiencing no scintillations in the second area of the detector. If either of the
dual ready brain components in eq. 18 is stochastically chosen at time tsc, then
both states will qualify under rule (3) to achieve consciousness. This will lead
to either
Φ(t > tsc) = D10B1B0 or Φ(t > tsc) = D01B0B1
If the superposition in eq. 18 survives the interaction, it will be reduced to the
state ψ(t)D00B0B0 as a consequence of a third observer or drift consciousness
on the part of either one of the observers.
The above results can be generalized to apply when there is more than one
particle in the wave ψ(t). In that case, components with detector states of the
form Dmn will appear in product with the particle wave diminished by m+ n
particles, where n is the number of particles striking the first scintillation area,
and m is the number striking the second scintillation area.
Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to describe what must happen when a conscious
observer witness a quantum mechanical interaction, and to find the simplest
rules that codify the results in different situations. The underlying assumption
is that macroscopic brains (conscious or not) are legitimate components of a
quantum mechanical superposition, and that Everett’s thesis is not a consider-
ation. To accomplish this, four rules are given that describe how brain states
affect the reduction of quantum mechanical systems.
These rules do not explicitly require that only one brain state of an observer
can be conscious at one time, but they do manage to bring about that result.
The absurdity of indefinitely many-worlds of consciousness is thereby avoided.
The many-world feature is here transferred to ready brain states that perform a
non-trivial function in this treatment. These states are on standby, ready to take
over the role of consciousness if and when they are stochastically chosen. When
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chosen, they contribute “real” boundary conditions that govern the solutions of
Schro¨dingers equation.
In a following paper I apply these four rules to the Schro¨dinger cat exper-
iment, and they give the normally expected results [10]. This case also allows
us to consider how the rules apply to two sequential interactions, and to two
parallel interactions. The cat paper will be followed by two more papers that
include two additional rules that are specific to a continuous model of the brain
[11, 12]. The first of these rules {called rule (3a) in ref. 11} is an extension of
rule (3) that is specific to a continuous brain.
The rules given in the present paper preserve the traditional epiphenomenal
nature of consciousness, for consciousness is not here given a causal role of
any kind. It simply appears when it is required to appear. However, the last
of the continuous brain rules (called rule (5) in ref. 12) gives consciousness a
causal role. It is structured in a way that allows von Neumann’s psycho-physical
parallelism to naturally occur (ref. 8). That is, the last rule enforces the parallel
principle that underlies and makes possible the evolution of a psycho-physical
parallelism in any conscious species [13]. As a result, consciousness has an effect
that is measurable in principle. The author has already proposed an experiment
that tests the parallel principle, so it implicitly tests the structure defined by
all of these rules [14].
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